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Abstract: 
Smart meters are being rolled out in large numbers throughout the world, 
with proponents claiming they are a critical step in the transition to a low-
carbon economy. Yet there are significant unresolved negative reactions to 
smart meters, principally based on the concern that smart meters might be 
used to infer the private activities that occur within a dwelling. Though smart 
meter data is classified as personal data, and as such protected under 
existing data protection frameworks in the EU, there are relevant exceptions, 
notably where the data is required for legitimate applications associated with 
the performance of 'regulated duties'.  This paper contributes to this debate 
by examining the data requirements for some of the proposed applications of 
smart meter data within the electricity supply industry, and investigates 
whether the use of personal data can be minimised or even avoided. The 
discussion includes system balancing, demand reduction, demand response 
and distribution network operation and planning, and indicates that, for most 
of these applications, the requirements for personal data can indeed be 
minimised. 'Privacy friendly' alternatives are discussed. 
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1 Drivers for growth and risks of rejection 
Smart meters are being installed in large numbers throughout the world due 
to the benefits they are expected to bring to the electricity supply industry 
and its customers. Different stakeholders have different objectives: suppliers 
(the companies that purchase electricity in the wholesale market and sell 
electricity to consumers in the retail market) are expecting to reduce 
operational overheads associated with manual meter reading and potentially 
improve customer loyalty or „stickyness‟ (Rogai, 2006); the operators of the 
transmission system and distribution networks hope to benefit from a more 
flexible demand side to enable greater penetrations of low-carbon 
technologies (Strbac et al., 2010); governments hope that the improvements 
in end-use energy efficiency promised by smart meters will help to achieve 
binding carbon reduction targets (Department for Energy and Climate 
Change, 2010); and end-users may hope to benefit from reduced electricity 
bills as they become more energy aware (Darby, 2006; Mott MacDonald, 
2007; Owen and Ward, 2006). With such expectations, it is no surprise that 
smart meters are undergoing a period of rapid growth (IDC Energy Insights, 
2011).  
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There are however significant unresolved negative reactions to smart 
meters.  Some journalists have accused smart meters of having the potential 
to be a „spy in the home‟, which will allow governments to monitor household 
behaviour (Jamieson, 2009). In Germany, the electricity supplier Yello Strom 
GmbH „won‟ an award in the Technology category of a „Big Brother‟ awards 
ceremony in 2008 for its plans to introduce smart meters to its customers. 
The judges of the yearly event, which is organised by the „FoeBuD‟ civil 
rights and privacy campaign group, thought that the supplier‟s smart 
metering activities would „potentially lead […] to a detailed surveillance of 
activities in the home‟ (FoeBuD e.V., 2008). Perhaps of most significance for 
EU member states, in April 2009, the Dutch Senate rejected a Smart 
Metering Bill, which would have mandated the installation of smart meters in 
every home in Holland (TILT, 2009). The Senate argued that the bill violated 
a citizen‟s right to privacy under European law. As a result, smart meters are 
now being rolled-out on a voluntary basis in Holland, considerably reducing 
their rate of deployment. Such negative reactions evidently have the potential 
to hinder the uptake and acceptance of smart meters throughout the world. 
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Perhaps the most obvious concern is that commercial entities, including 
companies of various forms, will seek to use smart meter data as a means to 
gather information about their market and customers. Less obvious perhaps, 
and certainly less discussed, is that smart meters may have consequences 
for the internal privacy of households. Imagine for example a domineering 
father using smart meter data to check up on the behaviours of his children 
or other family members. It is one thing to try to fend off a persistent 
marketing company that is trying to sell you something, but quite another 
thing if the person analysing your activities is someone you know personally.  
Thus we see that what started out as a purely technical and commercial 
ambition has evolved into a complex debate of privacy and ethics. The 
installation of smart meters is presented by their proponents as a critical step 
in the transition to a low-carbon economy, yet it is a step that could prove 
unwelcome to consumers if their privacy concerns are not adequately 
considered. The following sections of this paper first explore the concerns in 
more detail and then look at the legal framework for data protection. 
Following this, the various anticipated uses of smart meter data are 
discussed. 
2 What are the privacy concerns, and are they valid? 
2.1 Summary of concerns 
The main privacy concerns related to smart meters that have been reported 
in the literature have been summarised in Table 1 and have been grouped 
according to the type of application for which the data could be used.  
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Table 1 – Summary of privacy concerns related to smart meters. 
Application 
group 
Example concerns References 
Illegal uses Burglars finding out when homes are 
unoccupied. 
Stalkers tracking the movements of 
their victims. 
(Lisovich et al., 
2010; Quinn, 2009; 
Cavoukian et al., 
2010; McDaniel, 
2009; Lerner and 
Mulligan, 2008; 
Subrahmanyam, 
2005) 
Commercial 
uses 
Targeted advertising: Use of individual 
or aggregated household smart meter 
data to target advertising at a specific 
household or individual. Note: use of 
aggregated or „anonymous‟ data may 
be more acceptable than use of 
individual household data.  
Insurance adjusting e.g. do you tend to 
leave your appliances on when away 
from home? 
(Lisovich et al., 
2010; Quinn, 2009; 
Cavoukian et al., 
2010; McDaniel, 
2009; Anderson 
and Fuloria, 2010; 
Bohli et al., 2010) 
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Uses by law 
enforcement 
agencies 
Detection of illegal activities e.g. 
sweatshops, unlicensed commercial 
activities, drug production. 
Verifying defendant‟s claims e.g. that 
they were „at home all evening‟. 
(Lisovich et al., 
2010) 
Uses by 
other parties 
for legal 
purposes 
In a custody battle: do you leave your 
child home alone? 
In a landlord-tenant dispute: is the 
property over-occupied? 
(Quinn, 2009) 
Use by family 
members and 
other co-
inhabitants 
One householder „spying‟ on another 
e.g. parents checking if their children 
are sleeping or staying up late playing 
video games.  
Partners investigating each other‟s 
behaviour.  
(Hargreaves et al., 
2010) 
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2.2 Data resolution determines information disclosure 
All of the concerns listed above are based on a single concept: that smart 
meters might be used to reveal certain activities that occur within a dwelling 
– activities that people generally expect to be private. The ability to detect 
specific activities however depends on the time resolution of the 
consumption data. For example, quarterly or monthly readings of cumulative 
energy consumption are unlikely to reveal anything more than the dwelling‟s 
mean energy use and an indication of whether or not it was occupied – a 
long holiday for example could likely be identified. As the reading intervals 
are reduced however, more information can be ascertained. Daily recorded 
data for example could reveal that residents went away for the weekend or 
even that they go away every weekend. As the data interval is further 
reduced, a „load profile‟ is revealed, and this can then be used to observe the 
characteristic power consumption patterns associated with the usage of 
individual appliances and other domestic loads. 
To illustrate this point, an individual dwelling‟s load profile at different levels 
of resolution is shown in Figure 1. The half-hourly data shown in the top 
graph provides a good indication of active occupancy throughout the day – 
we use „active‟ to mean not asleep. In this case, it appears that people got up 
around 6am and likely went out. They returned around 9:30 and were busy 
until 18:30. They may then have gone out for the evening, and returned 
around 23:00. Clearly there is a degree of speculation in this analysis, but 
with a little practice it is perfectly possible to identify the general movements 
of residents with some confidence from half-hourly data. 
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Figure 1 – Demand data for a single dwelling averaged over half-hour and 1 
minute intervals. Source: DEHEMS (2011). 
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The lower graph uses 1-minute data (a resolution that some smart meters 
are already capable of) and illustrates the much greater detail that can be 
inferred. The annotations of specific appliances on this graph are actually 
known from additional data (in the form of appliance level plug monitors) that 
is not shown here. The point of the illustration however, is that a trained eye 
can identify the use of major appliances, based on their characteristic 
patterns of demand. A washing machine, for example, is typically 
characterised by a spike at the beginning of the cycle, associated with 
heating the water, and a second smaller spike at the end, associated with the 
spin. Performance of such analysis by-eye is relevant in the discussion of 
one householder checking up on another. More generally, such analysis can 
be performed by computers to provide extensive details of appliance use 
over long periods of time. Indeed this type of analysis is already a well 
developed technique, particularly for the purpose of Non-Intrusive Load 
Monitoring (NILM) (Drenker and Kader, 1999). Further reduction of the 
metering interval, for example to 1-second, greatly increases the range of 
identifiable appliances. 
Figure 2 summarises the type of information that can be inferred from data of 
increasing resolution. Most smart meters currently being installed worldwide 
log data hourly, half-hourly or at 15-minute intervals. This can provide a 
strong indication of occupancy, but has much less potential to reveal 
individual appliance use. Future generations of smart meters may be 
configured to provide much higher resolution. Concerns should be 
rationalised accordingly. 
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Figure 2 – Examples of information that can be inferred from increasing 
meter data resolution. 
Smart meter data is therefore justifiably viewed as being potentially sensitive 
personal data. The next section examines whether the data protection 
framework in the EU provides protection for consumers regarding the use of 
this data. 
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3 The legal framework: are consumers protected? 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides every EU 
citizen with „the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence‟, and that there shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except where it is in the 'interests of 
national security, public safety or economic well-being of a country' (Council 
of Europe, 1950). Indeed the Dutch Senate voted against plans for a 
mandatory roll-out of smart meters because it was argued that the plans 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights. This was based on the 
following grounds (Engage Consulting, 2010): that consumers should have 
the right to refuse the installation of the smart meter; that the planned 15-
minute load profile data recorded by the meters could reveal personal data; 
that the data storage was vulnerable; and that the ability for the utility to 
disconnect consumer remotely constituted a restriction of a primary necessity 
of life (although the discussion of this last topic is beyond the scope of this 
paper). 
13 
 
This fundamental right to privacy has been interpreted as a right to data 
protection for EU citizens, which has been established within the EU Data 
Protection Directive (CEC, 1995). The Data Protection Directive sets out 
common binding rules for data protection that each member state must 
adhere to by implementing national legislation that is consistent with the 
Directive‟s standards. Load profile data that allowed the identification of an 
individual, whether from the data itself or from the data and other held 
information such as a name and address, would be classified as personal 
data according to the Directive, and so should fall under its protection. In 
particular, according to the Directive,  personal data should be collected only 
for specified purposes, that data should be adequate and not excessive, and 
it should be kept in a form allowing identification for no longer than strictly 
necessary.  
In addition to these principles, personal data may only be legitimately 
processed according to the conditions specified in Article 7 of the Directive. 
These have been listed below in order of their applicability to smart metering 
according to Knyrim and Trieb (2011): 
a) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the controller is subject; or 
b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data 
subject prior to entering into a contract; or 
c) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or 
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d) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data 
are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1 (1) [of the Data Protection Directive] 
Knyrim and Trieb (2011) argue that the most favourable legal basis for smart 
meters would consist of a comprehensive national or European legal 
obligation that allowed the data controller to collect and process personal 
data. This could be justified under Article 13 of the Directive, which lists 
relevant exemptions and restrictions. Accordingly, Member States can 
restrict the scope of the obligations of the Data Protection Directive, where 
such restrictions are necessary to safeguard: 
(a) national security; 
(b) defence; 
(c) public security; 
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; 
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the 
European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; 
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even 
occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), 
(d) and (e); 
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(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. 
These exceptions could prove to be highly relevant for smart meter data. For 
example, meter data has long been used for detecting and prosecuting 
criminals – perhaps the most obvious being the detection of electricity theft 
(Depuru et al., 2011). Furthermore, as shall be discussed in the following 
section, smart meter data has relevant applications associated with regulated 
duties in the management of the electricity supply system. Indeed, Ofgem 
and DECC, who have been managing the policy design phase of the smart 
meter implementation programme in the UK, concluded that „consumers will 
have a choice over how their consumption data is used and by whom, except 
where data is required to fulfil regulated duties‟ (Ofgem and DECC, 2011). 
Work is therefore underway to explicitly define regulated duties, though the 
Government has been 'minded to define regulated duties narrowly' (Ofgem 
and DECC, 2011).  
Nonetheless, regardless of the most appropriate legal basis for the 
processing of smart meter data, and however regulated duties are defined, 
the principles of the Data Protection Directive should still be adhered to, and 
personal data should only be processed where it is necessary and relevant 
for the purposes of the legitimate application. The next section therefore 
examines the data requirements of some of the proposed applications, and 
in particular, questions whether the use of personal data in these 
applications can be minimised or even avoided. 
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4 Applications for smart meter data: can the use of personal 
data be minimised or avoided? 
4.1 System balancing and transmission network power flows 
System balancing, to maintain frequency, and the management of 
transmission network power flows, to maintain secure operation of the whole 
power system, require an accurate view of demand at large substations 
(grid/bulk supply points) in real time and forecasted into the future. The real-
time demands at these large substations are conventionally metered to 
provide this instantaneous view. There is no obvious role for domestic smart 
meter data in this real-time domain. 
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The forecasting of national and regional demands is also conventionally 
based on this high-level substation metered data. 'Top-down' analysis of the 
logged data provides accurate predictions of aggregated demands with 
respect to time-of-day, day-of-week, weather, television schedules etc. There 
may be potential to enhance these demand forecasts through the addition of 
'bottom-up' analysis based on data from domestic smart meters; see Swan 
and Ugursal (2009) for discussion of top-down and bottom-up techniques. 
One such enhancement could be an improved quantification of embedded 
generation, which is unavoidably mixed with demand in conventional 
substation metering. A second could be improved prediction of demand 
under unusual conditions, such as a major frequency disturbance or low 
voltage conditions. Smart meter data from individual dwellings could be used 
in this bottom-up analysis, but it is anticipated that volunteered and 
anonymised data from a subset of dwellings would be entirely adequate for 
this. 
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The above discussion refers mainly to the System Operator (National Grid in 
the case of the UK), in their performance of a 'regulated duty'. Suppliers also 
need accurate demand forecasts, in order to estimate the anticipated 
demand of their consumers, and to trade for these volumes in the wholesale 
electricity market. As profit-making private companies, suppliers are not 
performing a regulated duty in this regard – and thus have no claim to smart 
meter data in this way. As a result, it is most likely that suppliers, seeing a 
value in the potential for smart meter data to improve their demand forecasts, 
would need to obtain explicit consent from their consumers allowing their 
data to be used in this way. Nonetheless, it is arguable that it is very much in 
the public interest that suppliers do achieve a good balance, as this would 
minimise the costs incurred by the System Operator in resolving any system 
imbalances. Achieving a good supplier balance would therefore contribute to 
the overall efficiency of the system. 
It would appear therefore that system balancing is a legitimate application for 
smart meter data, though one that need have little or no impact in terms of 
consumer privacy. 
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4.2 Demand reduction 
Smart meter data can be used for demand reduction applications, specifically 
by providing improved information feedback to domestic consumers about 
their consumption. The EU Electricity Directive (CEC, 2009), which stipulates 
that Member States shall equip 80% of their consumers with 'intelligent 
metering systems' (where cost-effective) by 2020, explicitly requires that 
consumers have 'at their disposal' their consumption data at no extra cost, 
and that they 'are properly informed of actual electricity consumption and 
costs frequently enough to enable them to regulate their own energy 
consumption'. 
Smart meters can improve feedback of energy consumption in two ways: 
local feedback, for example through an in-home display unit that 
communicates directly with the meter, or remote feedback, such as 
'informative billing' (Darby, 2006) or on-line via the internet. This on-line 
feedback could be provided by the supplier, or indeed any other party 
providing an energy efficiency service to the consumer. See Darby (2006; 
2000) for discussion on the effectiveness of feedback on energy 
consumption. 
With local feedback, data is kept within the home and any data processing is 
typically performed in the meter itself or in the in-home display unit.   This is 
the expected architecture for the UK smart meter roll-out (Ofgem and DECC, 
2011), and has some merits from a privacy perspective, although concerns 
regarding internal household privacy may remain.  
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Remote feedback, whereby the data leaves the home, can facilitate more 
sophisticated data analysis, more flexible presentation of information to 
consumers, and thus potentially a greater reduction of demand. This type of 
feedback is similar to that already being provided by third party „clip-on‟ 
energy monitoring systems such as AlertMe (AlertMe, 2011) which is popular 
with some types of consumers. In these cases however, the household (or at 
least one member) is volunteering the data and is doing so not to the utility 
but to a relatively independent party. Collecting similar data directly from the 
utility smart meter is technically more elegant and usually more accurate but 
may be a rather different proposition to the householder in terms of where 
the data goes. Furthermore, it is likely that some consumers will welcome, 
use, and benefit from remote feedback, while others may perceive it as 
interference in their private lives.  
Finally, it should be noted that some forms of remote feedback do not require 
high resolution data, and may thus avoid privacy concerns. A company 
called OPOWER for example has achieved persistent energy reductions 
between 1 and 3% simply by providing consumers with a comparison of their 
monthly consumption against that of their neighbours (Allcott, 2010). 
Initiatives such as this have been motivated by insights into consumer 
behaviour from behavioural science, and would seem to be a useful area for 
further research (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). 
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4.2.1 Feedback and privacy within the home 
In the debates surrounding privacy and smart meters, the consumer is often 
assumed to be a single individual, or at least a cohesive group that can 
reasonably be thought of as a single 'unit'. Clearly though, there are 
situations where this might not be the case, and where individuals within the 
group will want to protect their privacy from other members of the group. 
Lodgers or tenants that live under the same roofs as their landlords are 
perhaps an obvious example. Adolescents may also not welcome the 
additional information about their activities that smart meters might provide to 
their parents – imagine parents coming home from a weekend away and to 
teenagers that swear they did not use the house for parties – yet why was so 
much electricity consumed late at night? 
Given that privacy is a fundamental right of the individual, individuals should 
be able to protect this even from other members of a shared household. 
Referring back to previous sections however, the main information disclosure 
from current (half-hourly) smart metering systems is regarding occupancy, 
and it is arguable that this type of information disclosure is implicitly accepted 
when sharing a household with others. Smart meters therefore only extend a 
type of information disclosure that was already present within the household, 
rather than introducing a new one that was not there previously. 
Nonetheless, smart meters do have the potential to affect household 
dynamics in unexpected ways, and as such it is a subject that deserves more 
attention. For further discussion, see Hargreaves et al. (2010) about the 
effects of feedback on household dynamics. 
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4.3 Demand Response 
Demand response – the ability to time-shift demand – will become 
increasingly valuable in the transition to a low-carbon power system 
(McKenna et al., 2011), and smart meters are regarded as a key enabling 
technology in the development of this service. Indeed, the Electricity 
Directive (CEC, 2009) specifically states that Member States shall implement 
'intelligent metering systems that shall assist the active participation of 
consumers in the electricity supply market'.  
Demand response is based principally on offering economic incentives, such 
as a dynamic pricing tariff, to the consumer, and it is critical therefore that 
any efforts that consumers make to change their consumption are rewarded 
accordingly. As demand response is time-critical, i.e. a response during a 
certain period can be worth more or less than a response during another 
period, it is necessary to be able to account for this accurately in both the 
retail and wholesale markets. The following sections examine the smart 
meter data requirements for these applications. For a broader summary of 
demand response in electricity markets see Albadi (2008). 
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4.3.1 Retail billing 
Given a time-varying demand and a time-varying price of electricity, retail 
billing can be performed in at least four different ways, as illustrated in Figure 
3. Where prices vary in time in a predictable or fixed format (e.g. Economy 7 
in the UK), then billing can be performed using meter registers 
(measurements of cumulative energy consumption), and a time clock that 
switches the meter from measuring on one register to another (Figure 3 a). 
The cumulative energy readings on each register can then be multiplied by 
the relevant price of electricity that was in effect during that register's 
switching period, in order to produce the consumer's bill.  
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Figure 3 – Retail billing with dynamic pricing 
Where prices are less predictable, billing can be performed by sending the 
interval data recorded by the meter to the external party responsible for 
billing (Figure 3 b). The external party will then calculate the bill using pricing 
information. Large industrial consumers on dynamic pricing contracts are 
traditionally billed in this manner.  
A third option is that prices are sent to the smart meter, which then calculates 
the bill itself (Figure 3 c). This price information could be broadcast to many 
meters at once, thus minimising communications bandwidth requirements. 
Furthermore, it need not be communicated in real-time: a smart meter could 
perfectly well log the high-resolution consumption data locally until it received 
a batch of pricing data with which to perform the calculation. 
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Finally, in Figure 3 d, rather than sending price information to the meter, it is 
the switching times of the meter registers that are adjusted dynamically. 
They can be adjusted from day to day or on short notice if required. 
Notice that only option b out of the four discussed above requires that high-
resolution meter data leave the home. Options c and d can both 
accommodate highly dynamic pricing, but greatly alleviate privacy concerns.  
4.3.2 Wholesale settlement 
Settlement is the term used to describe the process of accounting and 
arranging payments for the electricity bought by suppliers from Generators 
within the wholesale electricity market. It is important that demand response 
is accurately accounted for within this process, in order that suppliers are 
rewarded for the demand response actions of their consumers.  
An obvious way of achieving this would be to use half-hourly data from every 
consumer. Indeed, Elexon, the entity responsible for performing settlement in 
the wholesale electricity market in the UK, has indicated that the use of smart 
meter data to improve the settlement process constitutes an important 
potential benefit and driver for the collection of data at half-hourly resolution 
(Elexon, 2011). 
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In the past, half-hourly metering of every consumer was prohibitively 
expensive, and so settlement for domestic and other small consumers is 
conventionally performed using a process termed „profiling‟. This relies on 
half-hourly metering a small but statistically representative sample of the 
population and using this data to create a „deemed profile‟ (Elexon, 1997). 
The rest of the population are then assumed to have similar profiles. Any 
differences between a consumer's actual profile and the deemed profile, 
including those related to demand response, are effectively ignored, and thus 
suppliers cannot benefit from the demand response actions of individual 
consumers.  
However, the demand response actions of groups of consumers can be 
accommodated through the use of alternate profiles. In the UK, two profile 
classes are used for domestic consumers, corresponding to the two common 
electricity tariffs – standard flat-rate and Economy 7. The Economy 7 profile 
class allows settlement to account for demand response based on a static 
time-of-use tariff, as well as demand response based on the automated load 
control (switching of electric storage heaters).  
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This concept can be extended to include more innovative types of tariff. 
Indeed, Elexon has stated that „there is no fundamental obstacle to using 
profiling to support dynamic tariffs in the GB market‟ (Elexon, 2008), such as 
the six-rate critical peak EdF Tempo tariff (IEA, 2008) used in France. 
Furthermore, profiling arrangements could potentially support tariffs with 
even more flexibility, for example where register switching times are flexible 
(as per Figure 3 d), or called at short notice, for example in response to 
changes in frequency (Elexon, 2008). Where the profile classes are 
adequately representative of the various consumer segments, profiling 
therefore has the scope to account for demand response. From a privacy 
perspective, profiling has merit because it does not require load profile data 
from the entire population, only from a statistically representative sample.  
Profiling however might be inadequate under certain circumstances. A small, 
niche supplier for example, might have customers whose load profiles are 
quite different from those of the profile classes. Under these circumstances, 
the use of half-hourly demand data from the supplier's consumers would 
provide a more accurate settlement process. Where consent has been 
obtained from the consumer, the use of their half-hourly demand data within 
the settlement process should therefore be allowed. 
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4.3.3 Fast demand response 
It is anticipated that demand response will be increasingly used as a fast 
response resource for system balancing and this service will need to be 
effectively metered. Firstly, the System Operator will wish to verify in real-
time that any mechanism called to provide demand response has done so as 
expected. Secondly, there is the matter of improving predictions of the 
expected response and availability for future use. 
For the real-time monitoring of fast response the System Operator is likely to 
focus on the conventionally metered demands at large substations, as 
described earlier in section 4.1, and again it is unlikely that interval data from 
individual household smart meters will have any role in this. There is 
however the possibility that the operator would wish to see some 
acknowledgement of operation coming from the appliances that are providing 
the demand response. As an example, the LIPAedge demand response 
system in Long Island, New York, provides a fast reserve service by 
automatically controlling consumer's air conditioning units using 
programmable thermostats (Kirby, 2003). A two-way pager system is used to 
both control the thermostats, and to receive response and monitoring 
information from them. In this example, the communication with the 
appliance is not via the smart meter although it could well be routed that way 
in future schemes. The point however is that (half-hourly) interval data for the 
whole house consumption is unlikely to be relevant for the purposes of fast 
demand response. 
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4.4 Distribution system operation and planning 
The distribution system refers to the medium and low voltage networks that 
feed power from large transmission system substations (grid supply points) 
down to the consumers. In the UK, the distribution system includes the 
132kV, 33kV, 11kV and 400V networks (Central Networks, 2006). The higher 
levels are monitored at the large substations (bulk supply points, and primary 
substations), and so for reasons discussed previously, there is no obvious 
role for smart meter data at these levels. Network operators however have 
little visibility of the lower levels of the network (11kV and 400V), and as a 
result it is here that smart meter data could prove to be most useful.  
4.4.1 Voltage and power quality 
 Smart meters can readily be designed to measure voltage, in addition to 
energy consumption, which has been the principal concern of this paper. The 
voltage data could include steady-state voltages, flicker and harmonics all of 
which are of considerable interest to network operators, who have a duty to 
maintain voltages and power quality within strict limits throughout their 
networks. The information could also allow rapid identification of fault 
locations and in the longer term it could be used for historical performance 
monitoring of quality of service by the network operator or regulator.  
There are no reported concerns regarding the use of voltage data from smart 
meters, and there is no obvious way in which such data could be used to 
infer private, in-home activities. It would seem reasonable therefore that the 
processing of such data should not be subject to the same restrictions as 
demand data. 
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4.4.2 Outage detection and fault location 
Detection of faults on the low-voltage network has traditionally relied upon 
customers calling up to report an outage. As such calls start to build up, they 
can be used to piece together a picture of the extent of the outage and likely 
location of the fault. The high geographic resolution of smart meters however 
could provide this information almost instantaneously, thereby minimising 
‟customer minutes lost‟ – an important parameter by which network operators 
are judged and sometimes penalised. To achieve this, outages could be 
recognised from energy consumption data or, equally well, from the non-
sensitive voltage data described above. 
4.4.3 Operation nearer to limits 
The distribution system must be operated within the limits of the network 
infrastructure. In order not to cause equipment failure or to reduce equipment 
lifetime, current flow through power cables and transformers should not 
cause the thermal capacity of the equipment to be exceeded. Furthermore, 
there is a regulatory requirement that network voltages seen by consumers 
are maintained within limits of the network's nominal voltage – in the UK this 
is currently 230V +10% -6% (Electricity Regulations, 2002). The absence of 
real-time measurements from the low-voltage network however, can mean 
that operators have to be quite cautious and leave generous margins in 
operating the network. Smart meter data could be used to operate networks 
nearer to their limits, potentially delaying expensive network reinforcements, 
or reducing the number and duration of customer outages.   
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It should be possible to make use of anonymous or non-sensitive data for 
many of the activities associated with this application. As discussed 
previously, voltage data should have no privacy impacts and so could be 
used for monitoring network voltages. Monitoring that is associated with 
transformers could be achieved by installing metering at the secondary 
substations (though at additional cost), or alternatively by employing data 
scrambling techniques. For example, an algorithm could be used such that 
the data from each smart meter is meaningless, but that the aggregated sum 
is meaningful (Shi et al., 2011), and which could therefore be used for 
monitoring current flows through substation transformers. For network power 
flows, there is the possibility of using (non-sensitive) subsets of demand data 
where relevant – for example, peak demand data alone should be sufficient 
for determining the peak loading on cables.  
Ultimately however, there is an argument that individual household data 
would give the network operator the clearest picture about power flows – 
particularly for very localised parts of the network. Furthermore, it is 
envisaged that this will become increasingly valuable, given the expected 
uptake of low-carbon technologies such as electric vehicles and heat pumps 
(Strbac et al., 2010). 
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The above discussion refers to the Distribution Network Operator, in their 
performance of a 'regulated duty'. Furthermore, this application is clearly in 
the best interests of the consumers, in terms of ensuring a continuous, high-
quality electricity supply. This application would therefore appear to have a 
strong case for the use of smart meter data. Nonetheless, there may well be 
ways of achieving improved optimisation of network assets whilst maintaining 
privacy, for example through appropriate data selection or processing 
techniques. Further research is recommended on this topic.  
4.4.4 Planning reinforcement 
Distribution networks are designed to meet the expected demands of 
consumers, whilst ensuring that the thermal operating limits of power cables 
and transformers are not exceeded, and voltages seen by consumers stay 
within mandatory limits. The general design approach for residential 
distribution networks has changed little over the past decades (P B Power, 
2003).  
For domestic consumers in the UK, network design is generally based on the 
presence or not of electric heating within the dwelling (Central Networks, 
2006). The parameter of importance is the after diversity maximum demand 
(ADMD), which formally refers to 'the maximum demand, per customer, as 
the number of customers approaches infinity' (McQueen et al., 2004). This 
term refers to the supply capacity required per customer, and is used in 
network engineering calculations, for example, in order to estimate the 
maximum expected voltage drop along cables. As an example, a dwelling 
without electric heating would typically be assigned an ADMD of 2kW in the 
UK (Central Networks, 2006). 
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The advent of low-carbon technologies however poses a challenge to this 
traditional approach to distribution network design. Wide-scale use of electric 
vehicles and heat pumps for example, may increase demand considerably 
(Strbac et al., 2010), and will likely change the nature of the ADMD.  
Furthermore, microgeneration technologies, such as photovoltaic arrays, are 
of concern due to their potential to cause voltage rise along cables (Thomson 
and Infield, 2007).  
Faced with such challenges, data from smart meters could assist network 
operators in making well-informed decisions regarding future network design 
or reinforcement.  Rather than using assumed demand data, actual demand 
data could be used. Similar to the previous section's discussion, there is an 
argument that data from each and every consumer would give network 
operators the fullest picture on which to base their design decisions. 
Furthermore, this application would also appear to have a strong case for the 
use of smart meter data, as it is a 'regulated duty', and is in the best interests 
of the consumer. 
Alternatively, it may be the presence of low-carbon technologies that is of 
most relevance to network design, rather than the measured demand data 
from each individual household. The presence of microgeneration, heat 
pumps and vehicle charging points, could be identified and accounted for in 
the same way that electric storage heating is in current design practice. This 
would align the network capacity to the equipment permanently installed in 
dwellings, rather than to the consumption habits of the current residents. It 
would also avoid the need of individual demand data and thus help maintain 
consumer privacy.  
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It is noted that certain low-carbon technologies, electric vehicles and heat 
pumps in particular, can have a significantly different impact on the network 
depending on whether they are controlled in a co-ordinated 'smart' way. 
Strbac et al. have estimated that the benefits to the UK of deferred network 
reinforcement costs associated with 'smart meter-enabled active control' of 
electric vehicles and heat pumps (under a 100% penetration scenario) could 
be in the order of £3-10bn (Strbac, 2008). It may be important therefore, in 
future network design, to be able to identify when dwellings have an 'active' 
or 'passive' controlled low-carbon technology. It is not obvious however, that 
individual demand data would be relevant for this classification. An extension 
of the dwelling classification process described above would appear to be 
adequate. It is noted, for example, that many electric storage heaters in the 
UK are 'actively controlled' via the Radio Teleswitch system (McCartney, 
1993), and that the usefulness and operation of this system is not dependent 
or reliant upon the communication of high-resolution demand data to outside 
the home. 
5 Conclusions 
Consumer privacy concerns have the potential to delay smart meter 
deployments if they are not appropriately addressed at an early stage.  
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Examination of the types of concerns that have been documented reveals an 
important distinction between the privacy of the home from the outside world 
'external privacy', and the privacy of individual members of the household 
from each other 'internal privacy'. Information feedback enabled by smart 
metering systems is likely to have important implications for the internal 
privacy of the home, and could affect household dynamics in unexpected, 
and potentially undesirable, ways. 
Concerns are based on the potential for activities normally thought to be 
private to be inferred from smart meter data. Data resolution however 
determines the type of information that is disclosed. Current resolutions of 
smart metering systems (15 minute to 1 hour) provide a strong indication of 
occupancy, but have much less potential to reveal individual appliance use. 
Concerns should be rationalised accordingly. 
This paper has revealed that the requirements for sensitive meter data within 
the electricity supply industry are perhaps not as great as might be expected. 
The use of personal data within legitimate industry applications can often be 
minimised or avoided, and appropriate data selection or processing 
techniques have been suggested for consideration. 
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Of the legitimate applications investigated, distribution system operation and 
planning would appear to have the strongest case for the use of smart meter 
data from every individual household, in particular to optimise the operation 
of network assets given increasing penetrations of low-carbon technologies 
such as electric vehicles. It is suggested however that much can be done to 
maintain privacy within this application, for example by improving the current 
structural classification of dwellings within network design, and this is 
recommended as a useful topic for further research. 
Another valid case for the use of half-hourly smart meter data would appear 
to be within wholesale settlement. Firstly, such data could be used to 
increase the number and types profile classes used in current profiling 
arrangements, for example to allow demand response to be adequately 
accounted for. Secondly, where consumer load profiles are consistently 
different from the settlement profile classes, as may be the case for small, 
niche suppliers, such data could be used to improve the accuracy of the 
settlement process. 
This paper suggests that the use of appropriate 'privacy friendly' techniques 
can considerably reduce the electricity supply industry's requirements for 
sensitive smart meter data. It is recommended that such methods are 
considered as part of the ongoing development of smart meter architecture. 
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